E70KKURS 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 12 CR 376 (RMB) V. 5 RUDY KURNIAWAN, 6 Defendant. 7 -----x 8 New York, N.Y. July 24, 2014 9 11:45 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. RICHARD M. BERMAN, 12 District Judge 13 14 APPEARANCES 15 PREET BHARARA, 16 United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 17 STANLEY J. OKULA Assistant United States Attorney 18 JEROME MOONEY 19 VINCENT S. VERDIRAMO Attorneys for Defendant 20 21 22 23 24 25

(Case called)

THE COURT: Let me note just at the outset, Counsel, I've been handed a document called "Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Properties/Money Judgment." It's a forfeiture order in the amount of \$20 million, and it's signed by Mr. Adams for the government, by Mr. Kurniawan, and by Mr. Mooney as his counsel.

Is that your understanding, that this is to be entered into this case?

MR. OKULA: Yes. Your Honor had requested that the parties, if you will, settle or bring to the Court's attention whether there were any outstanding issues with respect to the forfeiture. We had alerted the Court that we had presented the defense with the consent order. I understand that now with the defendant's signature on it, that this essentially resolved, with the Court's imprimatur, the issues relating to forfeiture.

THE COURT: Mr. Mooney, is that your understanding as well?

MR. MOONEY: That is, your Honor.

And just to also clarify the record, we wanted to make sure that -- to clarify, that there's a list of assets that are contained within that order. Many of those assets are no longer in Mr. Kurniawan's possession -- they have been sold or gone other places -- and it is, of course, our understanding and confirmed by the government that they understand that he

doesn't necessarily have all of these things, and the forfeiture only extends to the extent that he still has an ownership, or control, or possession of the assets.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Kurniawan, you signed this document this morning after conferring with counsel?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

One small thing. I notice that it's not dated next to Mr. Kurniawan's signature. May I put in today's date in that space?

MR. MOONEY: Yes, please, your Honor. He did sign it just a few minutes ago.

THE COURT: Right. I'm going to insert July 24, 2014.

And then just for the record, let it be clear that I have also signed and dated myself this order of forfeiture.

So, that will be posted on the docket as part of the record.

So just let me just outline where we are going. And those of you who can't stay the whole time, you're welcome to come and go as you please. By prearrangement, we have a few things to accomplish. One relates to the issue of loss, possibly restitution, that remains unresolved. There was an application by the defense for what's called a Fatico hearing on this subject.

I determined that since the submissions -- the written submissions in the record had been so voluminous on the issue

of sentencing -- and helpful, I might add, there's at least a dozen letters between the government and defense counsel, roughly, even maybe the government has a couple more,

Mr. Mooney, than you do, but not much. So it's so extensive, I have so much information, that I don't think a full-blown evidentiary hearing is necessary, but I did say that I would allow the lawyers up to a half hour each to address that issue.

And after we finish that, we will take a brief pause, and then we will proceed to the sentencing.

And just one other thing that you should be aware of:

There is an issue of -- and I will explain in more detail what
this means -- loss restitution that likely won't be resolved
today and for which we have set a Tuesday afternoon, next week,
set aside to hear that discussion. That relates to an entity
called Mission Fine Wines. And the lawyers may have more to
say about that even today, but in the event that we don't
resolve that issue today, we will resolve that issue on
Tuesday, but it's my estimation -- correct me if I am wrong,
Counsel -- that however we resolve that issue is unlikely to
impact the sentence that's imposed today; that is to say, it's
unlikely to affect either the sentencing guideline range, or
the offense level, or the amount of loss, or the amount of
restitution, for that matter. It might affect the amount of

Is that your sense?

MR. OKULA: Yes, your Honor. We agree with that, because the amount of the intended loss, in the government's view, is tens of millions of dollars in excess of the \$20 million cutoff period for the guideline range, that it's irrelevant for a determination of the sentencing guidelines for the imposition of punishment today.

We also note, and the Court appreciated through the order your Honor entered, that there is a mechanism under the United States Code that allows your Honor to determine restitution within 90 days after imposing sentence, and that is implicit in your Honor's directive that we have a hearing, if necessary, next Tuesday.

I would just add that your Honor directed that we turn over, for lack of a better phrase, the Downey report related to the Mission Fine Wines. We did that this morning to Mr. Verdiramo. We filed it also electronically with the Court. I've also given the Court an update with respect to the William Koch restitution issue.

THE COURT: Is that a fair statement, Mr. Mooney?

MR. MOONEY: Yes, your Honor. And I might add with

regards to the -- to Mr. Koch, as of a few hours ago, we

finally concluded and entered into a settlement agreement as

between Mr. Kurniawan and Mr. Koch with regards to their civil

issues and their issues as it relates to, I guess, also this

case.

Mr. Koch is going to receive a consent judgment which will be entered in the California case. There are some additional things that Mr. Kurniawan has agreed to do once all of the proceedings related to this case are completed, and finished, and out of the way, and it is our understanding that Mr. Koch is withdrawing his request to participate and receive an order of restitution in this matter.

Mr. Okula's letter this morning about both the report with respect to Tuesday's possible hearing, and in that letter, the last paragraph says, "With respect to the restitution claim of William Koch, we have been informed by counsel for Mr. Koch that he is withdrawing his claim of restitution in this criminal proceeding, opting instead to pursue his remedies against the defendant in California State court proceedings." So that's compatible with what you have just said.

MR. MOONEY: That's the settlement that we just handed in.

THE COURT: I'm going to say this again later, but just so people understand, particularly what Mr. Okula was saying: In sentencing, we always do a sentencing guidelines analysis, even though the United States Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory. That's one of the factors to be considered, not to be the determinative factor.

In order to do a thorough guideline analysis in a case

like this, involving fraud, the Court has to make a determination as to what, legally speaking, the loss has been in the case. And as you will see in more detail soon, there is, as is not uncommon, a disagreement between the defense, and the government, and probation, by the way, as to what the loss amount in this case is.

The sentencing guidelines have parameters that would affect the sentencing guideline range. One parameter is I believe it's 7 million to 20 million dollars in loss. That, I think, is the defense position, that the loss falls there in that range. And the government says that the loss falls in excess of \$20 million, and the relevant range there is from 20 to up to 50 million dollars. So, if the loss, in fact, falls in this latter range, that would have the tendency to increase the offense level, and consequently increase the sentencing guideline range of incarceration. So, that is a determination that we will make during the course of the sentencing.

But in that regard, we are going to hear from -- since the government on this issue bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence what the loss amount is, why don't I turn to you for this part of the presentencing proceeding, Mr. Okula.

MR. OKULA: Thank you, your Honor. Do you wish me to address from here or the podium?

THE COURT: Whatever you're more comfortable doing.

Yes, that might be better.

MR. OKULA: I think at this point, your Honor, if I may, we are down to an issue with respect to three victims, because Mr. Koch has withdrawn his claim, because the defendant is conceding the Devine claim, the Reid Buerger claim. What we are left with is a dispute regarding the David Doyle claim, the Michael Fascitelli claim, and the Andrew Hobson claim. And I'm not going to go at length -- I know your Honor has budgeted a half hour for this, your Honor -- but we have made extensive submissions, and I respectfully submit that nothing that the defense has submitted in response to our submissions and our explanations about the bases for those restitution claims has undercut, certainly by a preponderance of the evidence, the government's proof establishing those claims. But I will briefly review what the group is and give the Court a little bit more evidence.

Your Honor, I would add, also, at the beginning that to the extent that the Court has any concern about the sufficiency or even the hearsay nature of the Twellman affidavit, because that was one of the main oppositions that the defendant advanced in trying to undercut the Twellman affidavit --

THE COURT: And you're now talking about an affidavit submitted on behalf of Mr. Doyle?

MR. OKULA: That's correct.

So, just in summary, Susan Twellman, who testified at trial with respect to the fake nature of, I believe, six bottles of DRC of Mr. Doyle -- on behalf of Mr. Doyle --

THE COURT: Hold on just one second, Mr. Okula, just so we make it clear. So, these three people -- Doyle,

Fascitelli and Hobson -- the reason we are devoting this extra time to this proceeding is quite simple in this respect, that if one accepts the government's proof simply with regard to these three people, they would take us over the \$20 million amount that I said before. So, this is not insignificant for that. That would mean that the loss amount would exceed \$20 million, it would still be less than \$50 million, but that would have an impact on the guideline of sentence?

MR. OKULA: And it would also mean, your Honor, if we have to get to that point, that we wouldn't have to get into the area of to what extent could and should your Honor — and we respectfully urge your Honor and emphatically urge your Honor — that the other proof in the case demonstrates tens of millions of dollars of intended loss, which separate and apart from the actual losses, get us above the \$20 million amount for guideline purposes.

But staying with the restitution figure, it's our position, your Honor, that the Twellman affidavit, which relies on an expert -- an ink expert that they employed who conducted analysis of virtually every single bottle of the Doyle

purchases from Mr. Kurniawan, for which he paid approximately \$15.11 million, that virtually every one of those bottles was fake.

Now, the determination in that regard, I realize that we didn't set forth with jot and tittle all of the particular aspects of that ink expert's analysis, nor do I think that it's necessary. But, your Honor, the expert who conducted that analysis is an individual named Barrett Deck. Mr. Deck has been engaged in analysis of ink and labels for over 22 years, and his analysis was that the nature of the labels that were on the bottles purchased by Mr. Doyle from Mr. Kurniawan; that is, that they were essentially of an ink jet type of printing that was done, it was of a type that was not done at the time the bottles were allegedly created. So, it's a simple analysis, your Honor.

And I realize I'm giving more detail now than was set forth in the four corners of our restitution submission for Mr. Doyle, but even if you look at the four corners of our submission, we spell out that Ms. Twellman swore under oath --

THE COURT: Let's do that, then. Let's look at what you have submitted and summarize it.

MR. OKULA: She said under oath in her affidavit that they retained this ink expert, and that this ink expert had determined that this overwhelming high percentage of the Doyle purchases — and she did essentially the analysis of how much

of the wine and determined that it was essentially 98 percent of their purchases were fake based on that ink analysis by that expert.

That standing alone, by a preponderance of the evidence, for restitution purposes in this proceeding --

THE COURT: And for loss purposes.

MR. OKULA: Yes.

So, turning now from the Doyle claim --

THE COURT: So, that gets you to what dollar figure for loss and/or restitution is the government asserting on behalf of Mr. Doyle?

MR. OKULA: Well, even though the Koch claim is withdrawn, we, of course, count the 2.1 million for Mr. Koch for the loss purposes, adding the \$15 million for David Doyle, that gets us to 17.1, adding the conceded \$1.5 million of Brian Devine, that gets us to 18.6. And then adding what the defense concedes is at least \$3 million of the Fascitelli claim, that puts us over the \$20 million, your Honor.

So, what we're arguing about, then, is what portion of the Fascitelli and the Hobson claims should also be counted.

So, let me turn to Mr. Fascitelli.

THE COURT: Before you do, you reduced the Doyle amount somewhat. Why don't you explain that. I think you went from 15.11 million to 15 million.

MR. OKULA: I just essentially rounded it down for the

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      purpose of doing the math, your Honor, just now.
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               THE COURT:
                           All right.
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               MR. OKULA: But by no means -- I submit, your Honor,
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      that that's the correct amount, the 15.11 amount.
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               THE COURT: Got you. OK. And now you're going to
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     Fascitelli?
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               MR. OKULA: Yes, your Honor, unless the Court has
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      further questions with respect to Mr. Doyle.
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               THE COURT: I don't. Incidentally, you will see, we,
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      too, as say the Court and Ms. Murray in particular, have gone
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      through the analysis of loss and done independently a
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      bottle-by-bottle analysis. So, we have a pretty good sense of
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      at least what we think are the loss amounts.
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               MR. OKULA: Turning, then, to Mr. Fascitelli, your
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      Honor, essentially the defendant's argument is that -- well,
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      let me back up a second.
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               As part of our submission, your Honor, we submitted
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      three reports of the government expert, Mr. Egan, Michael Egan.
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      And those three reports were analysis of what are known as
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      Cellar I, Cellar II, and the third report was --
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               THE COURT: You're talking now about the auctions --
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               MR. OKULA:
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               THE COURT:
                          -- for Cellar I, Cellar II, and the third
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      is?
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               MR. OKULA: The third report, your Honor, was a
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stand-alone report of the \$5.5 million worth of Fascitelli purchases from Mr. Kurniawan.

The confusion on the defendant's part, we respectfully submit, is that they take the 69 percent figure that related to the analysis of Cellar I or Cellar II, which is not part of the \$5.5 million claim, and therefore, say that that amount should be reduced or should serve as a reduction for the defendants —for the Fascitelli claim.

But what should be understood by the Court is that the analysis done by Mr. Egan of the \$5.5 million purchase was that the overwhelming super high percentage and what he estimates is 90 percent of the wines that constituted that \$5.5 million amount were determined by him to be fake.

So, our bottom line is this: You should not use a 69 percent figure to reduce the 5.5. At best, it should be a 10 percent reduction, which Egan says is an amount that is sort of a conservative estimate of ones that he either positively couldn't label as fakes or he wanted to have a conservative estimate on what he could stand by and represent or essentially have us represent in court. And it's the 90 percent figure. So if you apply the math to that -- and in applying the math, one important thing your Honor has to do is that it is conceded that the defendant never delivered \$684,000 worth of bottles to Mr. Fascitelli.

In doing the math, the defendant tried to apply their

69 percent figure to the whole \$5.5 million amount. But our claim with respect to that is very simple: If the defendant promised to deliver \$5.5 million worth of wine and delivered, say, 80 percent of that wine, and 90 percent of that 80 percent was fake, and didn't deliver the \$684,000, but held onto that money, that's as much a part of the restitution and fraud claim as delivering phony wine, because the fraud claim is simple — the victim here, Mr. Fascitelli, gave Mr. Kurniawan \$5.5 million and said give me that wine in exchange. The defendant agreed to do that. The fact that he didn't deliver some of the wine shouldn't serve to reduce his restitution claim.

So, if you apply the 90 percent math, your Honor, to the Fascitelli claim, so if you back out the 684,000, what you need to do is apply 90 percent to the \$4,816,000 figure analysis, and under that analysis, the total would be 5,018,400, and that consists of the 684,000, which you back out, plus 90 percent of the 4.816 million, which is 4,334,400. And if I haven't thoroughly confused you, your Honor, I'll run through it again for you.

THE COURT: I think I'm pretty clear, but you might run through it again just so everybody else --

MR. OKULA: Sure.

So we have the \$5.5 million at the outset, we're backing out 684,000, which leaves us with 4,816,000. The Egan

analysis is that 90 percent of that is fraudulent. So, if you apply 90 percent to the 4.816 million, you end up with 4,334,400. Then you add back in the amount that the defendant promised to deliver, but never delivered, which is the 684,000, which gives rise to a total of 5,018,400.

So that --

THE COURT: So, if you are correct there, between

Mr. Doyle and Mr. Fascitelli, you're over the \$20 million mark?

MR. OKULA: Indeed, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you were going to do Mr. Hobson, too, I think?

MR. OKULA: Yes, very briefly.

Your Honor, we submitted the Hobson reports. Recall that Mr. Fascitelli was a -- I'm sorry, Mr. Allan Frischman, who was a government expert, conducted a posttrial analysis of a representative sample of the Hobson bottles by going up to, I believe, Greenwich, Connecticut, Mr. Hobson's residence, and examining this representative sample, and looking at that sample and extrapolating the analysis -- and an extrapolation analysis, your Honor, is nothing new under restitution law. I know your Honor is familiar with different areas of cases. I happen to do principally criminal tax cases, and the law is abundantly clear that if there is a solid methodology employed in conducting a representative sample of a subset or a part of the universe that is believed to be fraudulent, and there is a

solid methodology in making the determination that a certain percentage of those are frauds or fakes, then the Court is perfectly entitled to rely on the extrapolation of that representative sample to the whole amount in arriving at even a restitution figure.

And that's what happened here, that Mr. Frischman analyzed, I believe, 50 representative bottles, determined through the elaborate notes that he made, which we submitted in the report, and the detail of the bottles that he submitted, which ones were fraudulent, which was well over 90 percent.

And so, when he applied the math, if you will, to what percentage of the Hobson claim was fraudulent, thus entitling Mr. Hobson to restitution, the bottom-line figure came out to 3,118,856.

Here, too, your Honor, there was an amount that the defendant promised to deliver, but did not deliver and kept Mr. Hobson's money, and that sort of has been a part -- that's the 552,531 figure, and that is figured in, I believe, the math that we did in arriving at the \$318,000 figure.

THE COURT: Just two comments I have:

The law of loss, so to speak, jurisprudence, says that in order to figure out the actual and/or intended loss, first of all, one needs to do no more than a reasonable approximation, but nevertheless, in at least some of the examples that you have been dealing with, for example,

Mr. Doyle, Ms. Twellman, in addition to her affidavit, I believe, attaches a bottle-by-bottle addendum to that affidavit explaining how she arrived at her figure, and the same is done in the Hobson case. There's also a, I don't know, four-page description of what those bottles contain.

MR. OKULA: Indeed, your Honor. That was implicit in my presentation that your Honor is familiar with, the bottle-by-bottle analysis for both the Doyle claim as part of the Twellman analysis and the Hobson claim as part of the Frischman analysis.

So, your Honor, unless you have any further questions, I know you'll let us have a chance to be heard again with respect to the proper sentence, but we will rest on our papers here.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. OKULA: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Mooney?

MR. MOONEY: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, the difficulty with the Doyle claim, and the reason that we had requested a Fatico hearing with regards to Mr. Doyle's claim, is that we get sort of a claim that I bought so many apples, then they turned into X number of oranges; therefore, I'm entitled to be recompensed for all of the original apples, and we don't even know how they got there.

Today, for the first time -- for the first time a few

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minutes ago, we're given the name of this paper expert who apparently looked at the labels on the Doyle wine and now tells us that these almost 2,000 bottles are counterfeit. We have had no opportunity to follow up or check up on this person and see what his credentials are. We have seen nothing in the way of any kind of report. We have been given minimal information with regards to how this individual went about to supposedly doing the things that he was doing.

This is \$15 million. This isn't a 15,000, or 1,500, or \$15 claim, this is a \$15 million claim that is being put forth, and we know -- we don't know -- what we don't know is from these 2,000 bottles that Ms. Twellman says that they took and isolated when Mr. Kurniawan was arrested, we don't know how that matches up with what was bought. We have been given a schedule that shows the payment of the \$15.1 million. We have that, so we know he paid \$15.1 million to buy wine. We don't know how much wine and how many bottles that he bought. We do know, when we look at it, that it goes back to quite an early period of time.

It's somewhat incredulous to believe that in March of 2012, bottles purchased in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, all of those bottles are available, could be collected, and put in the warehouse, especially when wines matching the descriptions of all of those show on the wine menus of Mr. Doyle's restaurants in Australia, and that the comments that have been made in the

social media with regard to those restaurants talk about drinking them. There's discussions of drinking 1945 DRCs and how wonderful the 1945 DRCs were when they drank them.

To believe that they somehow have all this wine, and can collect it, and put it together is -- like I say, it just doesn't work. It defies reality.

They don't tie Exhibit B to Exhibit A in any way. So, we don't know what portion of Exhibit A is reflected in Exhibit B, because when they pull together their Exhibit B, and when they give us this list of wine that they've sent off to this warehouse, they don't tell us what Mr. Doyle paid for the wine.

Instead, what they tell us is what Mr. Doyle believes that that wine would be worth today, which is about \$19 million. Which, by the way, is kind of interesting when Ms. Twellman is saying in her affidavit that somehow Mr. Kurniawan has done significant damage to the fine wine market, yet these 2,000 bottles, if they were authentic, would be worth something closer to 20 million today instead of 15 million that they're claiming was even paid for them. So, obviously there's been an appreciation, and we don't even know how much more because we don't know -- we just don't know what percentage and what portion those 2,000 bottles make up of the total amount of bottles that were purchased.

And we, quite frankly, your Honor, have very low

confidence in -- this isn't a wine expert, this is some kind of an ink expert who came in and looked at things, and there's no report. We don't know how many bottles he looked at, we don't know what methodology was employed, we just don't have any of that information, yet this is the most substantial claim that's out there being made. It's completely insufficient for the purposes of us even being able to adequately respond and to deal with. And that's why we supplied copies of the wine menus from the restaurants, to show what was there, and that's why we asked for a Fatico hearing with regards to this, because we ought to have an opportunity to look into it.

One of the things that keeps getting forgotten in all of this: The government talks about the millions of dollars that Mr. Kurniawan received from the sale of wines, and he did. He got a lot of money from selling wines. But we have also produced, and we gave your Honor the records that showed that Mr. Kurniawan bought, and paid for, \$40 million worth of wine. That's what he bought, and he collected all that.

Then, he sold wine. And the government has seized the warehouse that Mr. Kurniawan had, and the government's expert has told us that there is about \$3-1/2 million worth of wine in that warehouse. Therefore, we know that over \$36 million in wine purchased by Mr. Kurniawan was sold. It's a substantial part of what went out in all of these sales.

Yet, now we have all of these people -- we have

Mr. Doyle, and we have Mr. Fascitelli, and others that are coming in — that say, well, every bottle that I bought was a counterfeit, virtually every bottle that I bought was a counterfeit. This is easy, this is what I paid; therefore, that's what I want back, and it doesn't match up with reality.

The other reality that it doesn't match up with is the ability of this man to even have been able to create that. He had phenomenal taste. He was able to recreate and put together something which matched the taste of these fine wines. But your Honor saw the pictures at trial. Your Honor saw the sink in the house. Your Honor saw the little device that could be used to put the corks in and to recork it. And granted, he had all the labels that he might need, because it's as easy to print 500 labels as five — he had all the labels, he had all those parts — but putting together each of those bottles would be a very time-consuming thing.

And we saw for ourself when the FBI came in and raided the house, you know, three bottles soaking in the sink, a couple of bottles sitting up on the counter. This is not a production line that turns out thousands and thousands of bottles, as the government would want us to believe, because we've got \$40 million worth of stuff that he bought and is reselling, and that's a big part of what goes out there.

And that's why when we look at some of the reports, like Mr. Doyle says, OK, 69 percent of what was sold in these

auctions was probably counterfeit. Those are more realistic sorts of figures.

The Doyle figures -- the Doyle claim is insufficient. We haven't been given enough information to be able to adequately respond to it, and the Court hasn't been given enough information even to make proper estimates with regards to it. It's too big a claim, it's too important a claim, to be accepted, and we ask the Court to reject that.

As to Mr. Fascitelli, again, it's the same sort of difficulties. 5.5 million is what he says he paid for the wine, yet somehow it's all bad.

And I am confused by the argument, because it was our understanding that 5.5 million represents what Mr. Fascitelli bought altogether. Well, he bought at some of these auctions. In fact, when Mr. Egan testified, he put these slides up on during trial, he tells us that the two big buyers were Fascitelli and Koch. Those were the two big buyers that bought at those auctions. And why would we be given all the reports on Mr. Egan if the reports weren't covering Mr. Fascitelli's purchases. That's what they were coming through for. Granted, they don't say, they say it's a client, some unnamed client.

So the 69 percent is what we see when we look at those reports, and it's -- quite frankly, it's a fair figure to apply. We think it's an appropriate figure to apply, and we think that it gives a fair number to Mr. Fascitelli.

And we are willing -- we think, your Honor, that for the purposes of loss calculation, wines that were never delivered ought not to be counted for loss calculation. This case was not about Mr. Kurniawan promising and not delivering wines. This was a case about Mr. Kurniawan promising and delivering the wrong wines. So, some of the wines that he did were wrong. But we do agree that those numbers can come back in for restitution purposes, because Mr. Kurniawan agrees that he owes that money to people, they never got anything. We just think that should be kept out.

So, that's why, when you look at our calculations, we believe --

THE COURT: Do you have a number for Mr. Doyle and/or a number for Mr. Fascitelli?

MR. MOONEY: We have no number for Mr. Doyle, your Honor, because we have absolutely inadequate information to work with. We just don't know. If you applied Mr. Egan's figures, the 69 percent figure, the 69 percent of what Mr. Doyle bought was also probably bad — what would that give us — that would put us up around 8 or 9 million. But it's just inadequate information to deal with. We're poking a stick in the dark on Mr. Doyle.

As for Mr. Fascitelli, we do, your Honor, we claim that the loss figure should be 3.3 million, but the restitution should be 3,795,000. And like I say, for the 3,795,000, we've

put that 684,000 back in. So we think that's a proper figure for Mr. Fascitelli.

Mr. Hobson, we're having some of the same sort of difficulties with. We were not able to adequately determine from what we were given a proper way to really sort of put that together and figure it out.

As a result, what we did do is we had -- we did have a good expert report there, and the expert looked at, and identified a bunch of bottles, and said here's the bottles that we think are bad. Now, some of them, the bottles, he said, well, I can't make an opinion on these, I don't know, I'm not saying one way or the other. I don't think you can hold those as bad bottles, but with regards to the ones that he listed as being improper, we actually went through and found them in the purchase receipts from Mr. Hobson, and we gave your Honor a chart, and if you'll look at the chart, they come up to a total taking up -- the ones that he had no opinion on, it's \$845,366. To that, we added back -- we think the loss figure would be 845,000. We think the restitution figure, you add back in the 552,000 that he didn't receive, and it comes to 1,397,000.

The same rules that are required for the purposes of a conviction or trial really don't apply in these proceedings, but still, still, the real --

THE COURT: The burden of proof here is preponderance of the evidence.

MR. MOONEY: Correct. We're down from conviction.

And the evidence that's relied upon has to have some reliability, and there's got to be a chain. It has to go, I mean, A, B, C, D, E. You can't go A, B, C, E. And, unfortunately, what we got when we're looking to some of these claims that are being presented is a big gap. And when there's a gap, we are not in a position where we can even confront it and come forward, because there's just a gap there, the information is insufficient. We deal in things that follow logically from one point to another, and that requires that the pieces be tied together.

And in the case of Mr. Doyle, they're absolutely not tied together. In the case of Mr. Fascitelli, there is some information that isn't there, but we can come to a conclusion based upon the reports that are done. And in the case of Mr. Hobson, there's information there that would support the numbers that we have put forth.

So, we ask your Honor to use those numbers, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. Thanks.

Did you want a one-minute rebuttal?

MR. OKULA: Since we have the burden, just two minutes, very briefly, your Honor, to respond to a couple of the arguments that they perhaps are not worthy of response, but I just wanted to beat the drum, nonetheless.

With respect to the Twellman affidavit and the underlying analysis done by the ink expert, I think I heard Mr. Mooney say something to the effect of, well, that person was just an ink expert. Well, so what? If that person determines that laser jet printing was not used on those types of wine bottles in Burgundy during those years, it's case over. So you don't need a wine expert to come in to tell you that those bottles are fake. Some person with particularized knowledge and the ability to give you information like that those — that printing wasn't done is plainly sufficient.

The final thing, your Honor, is Mr. Mooney made the argument essentially that they were hampered, they had a complete inability to look into some of these claims. Now, don't get me wrong, I'm not running away from our burden here, I recognize we have the burden here, and I submit, most respectfully, that we satisfied it overwhelmingly.

But the mere fact that we have the burden doesn't hamper Mr. Mooney from using all the tools that he has available to him to go out, to check these bottles himself.

After all, if there's one person in this courtroom who has the ability to look at those bottles and determine whether they're his fakes, you're not looking at that person, your Honor, he's seated right there. So, if Mr. Mooney wanted to go up to look at the Hobson bottles, all he had to do was ask your Honor for the issuance of a 17(c) subpoena to get some of those bottles

to look at them himself.

So, once again, your Honor, I'm not running away from our burden. We demonstrated what we needed to demonstrate, but to make the argument that they were completely hamstrung from conducting any analysis themselves of any of these claims is factually inaccurate.

Thank you.

THE COURT: So, I had one -- Mr. Mooney, did you want one more --

MR. MOONEY: Yes. I just want to say, your Honor,
Ms. Twellman's affidavit is dated last week. This isn't
something that they produced and gave us a month or so ago when
there was time -- that's why we asked for a Fatico hearing, so
we could do things like this and take a look at it. It was
July 16th, and we are now the 24th.

THE COURT: So, I have one other question for the government: On the victims, are you still of the view that there are ten or more victims in a legal sense, or are you less than that?

MR. OKULA: No. We are of the view that there are more than ten, your Honor, because the people who were victimized through, for instance, the purchases at the auctions, who upon determining that these were fakes, that the auction house took them back. Or when Kurniawan, the defendant, consigned to the Chicago Hart Davis Hart, the

distributor there, some of his wines for sale, essentially asked them to act as his spokesperson to consign them for sale to the public, they rejected them as fakes.

Those are as much victims as the people who actually suffered out of pocket. And we submitted, your Honor, that longer list of people who were victims of the defendant for intended loss purpose. Now, they have been made whole because they got reimbursement from the auction houses, but there are plainly more than ten, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. So we are going to take a break now, and then we will resume in about five or ten minutes. Thanks very much.

MR. OKULA: Thank you, your Honor.

(Recess)

THE COURT: My inclination here, before this oral argument and even now, is that the record is sufficient to reach conclusions as to loss, restitution, et cetera, but my practice has been, particularly in a criminal case, to go the extra mile on behalf of the defense in a situation where the defense has asked for further process and further hearing. So, I am going to do that in this case as well.

We have already set a separate proceeding for Mission Fine Wines. We will do the same for Doyle.

What exactly, Mr. Mooney -- or do you want to go off the record and confer with counsel for the government and let

(Pause)

me know who's needed, what's needed, you want to see the expert for Doyle? Why don't you spend a minute with Mr. Okula.

MR. MOONEY: Your Honor, the government's going to provide us with a copy of the expert report, which apparently they have, and then I think we can decide from there whether the expert needs to be present, or just Ms. Twellman, or both of them.

THE COURT: And when -- you think it's feasible to do this on the time we have set aside, on Tuesday?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  MOONEY: I have a little bit of a difficulty with that, your Honor. I have --

THE COURT: Well, you talk to Mr. Okula, and obviously if we are going to do it, we are going to do it at a time that you can all be there.

MR. MOONEY: I have a hearing in a place called Heber, Utah, on Wednesday morning, and I am not sure how I do a 2:30 afternoon hearing in New York on Tuesday and get to Heber, Utah, by 8 o'clock Wednesday morning.

THE COURT: All right. When can you let me know what you both decided in terms of a date?

MR. MOONEY: I think first thing tomorrow morning.

MR. OKULA: Yes.

MR. MOONEY: First thing tomorrow morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. So I think that's the fairest thing

to do. As I say, Mr. Okula, my tendency was to agree that there is sufficient information in the record, but we will go the extra step in favor of letting the defense get a crack at the expert.

MR. OKULA: And we are happy to do that, your Honor. In fact, I was going to offer it up at the beginning of our presentation. I didn't know that it would be necessary or required by the Court, but I had spoken to counsel for Mr. Doyle, who has been the intermediary and working with us diligently in connection with the Twellman and the Deck information, and Ms. Twellman, I understood, would be available next week, but we will agree with Mr. Mooney in the event — or settle some dates that we can present to the Court.

THE COURT: OK.

Mr. Mooney, you should also consider whether you want to combine the Mission Wine with this, at the same time, whenever that's going to be. It might be the most efficient for you, who does the traveling.

MR. MOONEY: Delta would probably prefer us to have two of them. I personally would prefer them to be a single hearing.

THE COURT: So I'll hear from you tomorrow morning with suggested dates. And there's one other matter that I wanted to mention to particularly Mr. Okula.

I've asked you a couple of times about this issue of

victims and the number of victims, because, like the loss amount, the number of victims, whether it's ten or more or whether it's fewer, also impacts the offense level, makes a big difference, and consequently, that drives the sentencing guideline range. I have obviously some question in my mind.

I would ask you, Mr. Okula, when you are considering victim, are you also taking into account the application note that applies to, I think it's 2B1.1? You don't have to answer now. Take a look at that and see if that doesn't impact your evaluation of the number of victims or the information that's necessary to present in support of the number of victims.

MR. OKULA: I will indeed, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: OK.

So, we are adjourned. We have a date. We will leave it on the calendar for the moment, the Tuesday afternoon date, just for purposes of good order, but it's anticipated that I will hear jointly from you first thing tomorrow morning, OK?

Great. Thanks very much.

MR. MOONEY: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: You bet.

(Pause)

THE COURT: Christine mentioned that you all have proposed three dates. Of those, I would say the one that is most sensible is August 4, it's a Monday.

I'm thinking, also, for you, Mr. Mooney, you might

want to come on the Sunday, the day before, to be here, obviously, or the Saturday might be easiest for you travel wise.

So I think that's the date that makes most sense. That works for everybody and all the people, the witnesses.

My plan -- I take it yours, also, both of you -- would be that when we conclude this proceeding in the morning, we would then move to sentencing, so that we would wrap it up on the same day, right?

MR. OKULA: Very well. Yes, your Honor.

And I think we alluded earlier, and certainly to our filing — in our filing this morning, to the notion that as we are providing additional information, we are continuing to have conversations with the defense about, in light of the additional information, whether a hearing is still necessary. Should we ultimately reach a decision in some regard, either with regard to the Doyle claim or the Mission Fine Wine claim, that the witnesses are not necessary, that the defense does not wish a hearing on that, I assume we can alert the Court, and then we can proceed to the sentencing at the earlier time that day?

THE COURT: On the same day?

MR. OKULA: Yes, same day.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. OKULA: The start time.

THE COURT: We will absolutely reserve -- well, yes, I think we will stick with that. I was going to say it can even be earlier than that, perhaps, but we're splitting hairs in terms of how much time is available.

So, yes, 8/4 is devoted to you. And we would do the hearing at, let's say, 9:30, we'll shoot for 9:30 on the 4th.

And if, as Mr. Okula is pointing out, something else happens, and you don't need to have a hearing, we will do the sentencing at 9:30. How's that?

MR. MOONEY: We always try to be as accommodating and helpful as we can, your Honor.

THE COURT: And me, too.

All right. Great.

MR. OKULA: Just for point of clarification, your Honor, do we understand correctly that your Honor has heard enough with respect to Fascitelli and Hobson, and that that issue, for your matter, you obviously have to announce where you're at that, but there is nothing additional your Honor wants on those?

THE COURT: I'm comfortable that I have enough information. I think, as Mr. Mooney pointed out, that the amount in question for Doyle is so significant, that it kind is the most important that we do.

MR. OKULA: Understood, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks so much.

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                MR. MOONEY: Thank you, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: You bet.
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                MR. VERDIRAMO: Thank you, your Honor.
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